In the reasonings of Plato and Aristotle, there is an underlying assumption of causality. Existence is energy to Aristotle; to Plato it is intellect (νους), but intellect which holds in itself all the ideas of the universe,' in their causal significance. Plato and Aristotle alike placed being beyond thought-beyond knowledge. Plato, however, reaches a more practical result, when, feeling the inadequateness of the concept of substantiality or existence, he lays it down in the Sophist that the being of things is nothing but their power (δυναμ,ις). Plato saw, before Aristotle, that, in the regress of mo\ 7 ements, there must be a first term. The intellect (νους), which is existence to Plato, is something which holds in itself all the ideas of the universe in their causal significance. The psychology of Plato presupposed mind wherever there was motion, and so he was led to postulate Deity s Prime Mover of the universe, with subordinate or depnted deities. (See the Timceus, 41 B and 42.) Between the Primal Cause and ordinary mortals Plato set these inferior or subordinate deities, apparently, s a way of accounting for the shortcomings of the world. (See the Timceus, 41C.) But a more important consideration, in the present connexion, is that Plato expressly recognises the dependence of the world upon a cause beyond itself-παντί γαρ αδύνατον χωρίς αίτιου γένεσιν αχείν. (See Timoeus 28 Α and B.) Plato, in the second book of the Republik, already treats in express terms of the Divine causality.
In the reasonings of Plato and Aristotle, there is an underlying assumption of causality. Existence is energy to Aristotle; to Plato it is intellect (νους), but intellect which holds in itself all the ideas of the universe,' in their causal significance. Plato and Aristotle alike placed being beyond thought-beyond knowledge. Plato, however, reaches a more practical result, when, feeling the inadequateness of the concept of substantiality or existence, he lays it down in the Sophist that the being of things is nothing but their power (δυναμ,ις). Plato saw, before Aristotle, that, in the regress of mo\ 7 ements, there must be a first term. The intellect (νους), which is existence to Plato, is something which holds in itself all the ideas of the universe in their causal significance. The psychology of Plato presupposed mind wherever there was motion, and so he was led to postulate Deity s Prime Mover of the universe, with subordinate or depnted deities. (See the Timceus, 41 B and 42.) Between the Primal Cause and ordinary mortals Plato set these inferior or subordinate deities, apparently, s a way of accounting for the shortcomings of the world. (See the Timceus, 41C.) But a more important consideration, in the present connexion, is that Plato expressly recognises the dependence of the world upon a cause beyond itself-παντί γαρ αδύνατον χωρίς αίτιου γένεσιν αχείν. (See Timoeus 28 Α and B.) Plato, in the second book of the Republik, already treats in express terms of the Divine causality. lic goes oii, in the sixth book, to give bis thought more precise form, \vhcn he explicitly says the Good is not mere existence-ουσία-but transcends it in dignity and power. In the seventh book, he affirms the Good to be cause of all that is bright and beaatiful in the worlds of the visible and the invisible-first and rnost profound of efficient causes. Despising the outward and ph nomenal, Plato rises to the recognition of a Supreme Cause, s real and infinite essence, indeed, but yet transcendently abstract and ideal. While the earlier thinkers of Greece were prone to accept change simply s a fact, Aristotle had surer grasp on the true idea of cause, s something that must be uncaused or self-caused. The Platonists saw that change must be referred to that which does not change, but they did not have a like apprehension of hoxv truly causative or originative Primal Reality must be-hpw little it could be mere inactive being. They were too content to rest in the Supreme Idea, rather than in definitely postulated Ê fficient Cause. This Primal Reality of the universe, with its eternal energy, is, in nature, absolute and self-originative Reason : for such is Aristotle's view of ultimate Causation. In his Physics, Aristotle lays it down that nothing which is. moved moves itself -άπαν το κινουμενον ανάγκη οπό τίνος χινεισθαι. (Phys., VII, 1.) And, again, he designates efficient cause more precisely s moving cause-το δ'όθεν ή κίνησις. (Phys., Π, 7.) In the plainest terms, Aristotle postulates, in the twelfth book of'his Metaphysics, a First Cause, without which the world would not exist. In formulating his four kinds of cause, Aristotle gaye efficient Cause (αρχή της κινήσεως) or "moving" Cause (το κινητικόν) the form it was substantially to wear through the Middle Ages. Every inovement argues a moving Cause, and such moving Cause must be actual being-no mere potentiality. Only such actual being can exert that ενέργεια which means the inoyement here involved. As Aristotle reads the order, law, and progress of the phenomenal universe, the First Cause-or Prime Mover-is to him such ενέργεια. He is content with no essence-ουσία -of things in abstracto^ but seeks that ενέργεια by which their activity is expressed. As the series of inoving Causes cannot be endless, his First Cause or Prime Motor (πρώτον κινούν άκίνητον) is taken that he rnay escape from the finitude of the actuaL The unmoved and "motionless cause of motion" is God. It will be observed that Aristotle allows to Deity no relation to the world save the niotion which He coinmunicates to it, and thus He remains in a state of Separation from it. His relation is one of pure transcendence; Deity does not appear s active and interested Cause of the life of the world. But it should be noticed that Aristotle, in holding to the independence of that Divine Reason which is the primary source of all energy, and inaintaining its Separation from the world, does not view the action of the Primal Cause-Divine Reason-upon the world-process s mechanical, but rather regards the self-activity of each and every part s having been provided for, through immanent energy which has been communicated to thein.
Thus then, we see the result of Aristotle's large concern with φύσις-an interest so different from that of Plato in final Causein a quite astonishing search after the attainment of Causes, and the rnaintenance of a scientific conception of the world. In his Physics, Aristotle argues, in a deep and basal fashion, that inovernent cannot be self-caused, in the case of extended substance, and further, that motion must be without beginning and quite continuous. In his JMetaphysics, Aristotle makes movement consist of possibility passing into actuality, and takes the source of movement to be completely realised actuality. In other words, it is form pure and without admixture of matter. It should be observed how important was. Aristotle's distinction between selfactivity-purus actus-and potency. It opens the way for distinguishing between the Primal Ground of things-cornplete in itself and not moved-and the nature of things themselves, s conditioned in character and evolutional in law. So far s it goes, Aristotle's insight was great, but it was, of course, halting in its issue. For bis System was undoubtedly statical in character, and he neither feit the need, nor saw the mode, of relating the Primal Groun'd to the world of imperfection that is. No doubt, he may have meant to improve upon Platonic Idea by such external Cause äs he invoked to convert possibility into actuality, but, however his hold on the facts of experience may have been greater, his method was yet too external to produce satisfactory results. So that, although Aristotle did so much for the subject of Causation, the influence of Plato's ideas overbore much of the effect properly to have been expected. For too much was allowed to formal cause, so that efficient-äs well äs material and finalcauses were left in the shade. And, of course, the imperfection of his idea of causation is to be noted, no less than his meritorious treatment, since he is even prepared to drop the notion of sequence, and does not regard cause äs an antecedent with determining power. Causality only throws the explanation Wck upon an antecedent that continually flees us, and the only escape is by taking causality itself up into some form of self-activity, äs the only category that explains itself. Aristotle has not dealt with the problem of efficient Cause or Principle is satisfactorily related to the world, but at least he gave invaluable aid and such a noteworthy contribution towards the solution of the problem äs to be of imperishable memory.
